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COMMENTS ON STEVEN SMITH, PAGANS
AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY
MICHAEL P. MORELAND†
One of the most interesting aspects of this generally very
interesting book was the discussion of sexual morality in
paganism and Christianity. I have thought for a while that much
of the contemporary debate about religious freedom is not about
religious freedom in a generic sense but instead about religious
freedom in a very particular context—sex. But that is a
descriptive point—much more challenging is trying to give an
account of why sex should have come to be (or as Smith’s
argument implies, has long been) the battlefield on which much
of the fight over religious freedom takes place. My offhand
thought in these remarks is that our debates about religious
freedom would benefit from a more sustained engagement with
this seemingly odd feature of our late modern age—that the
fragile consensus around religious toleration in modernity has
started to come undone over sexuality—and the deeper reasons
for it.
It is worth noting that this concern with sexuality (and the
progressive opposition between religious freedom and sexual
liberation) is a relatively recent turn in the debate over religious
freedom, a familiar story to law and religion scholars. Religious
freedom during the era of the Warren and Burger Courts was
seen as mostly a progressive cause, as witnessed by cases
involving those seeking exemption from the draft or from
incidental impositions on religious practice by members of small,
minority religious groups (such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, SeventhDay Adventists, and the Amish).
The proponent of this
constitutional approach to religious freedom was Justice
Brennan, a liberal hero who combined enthusiasm for the Court’s
decisions in Griswold and Roe amid the sexual revolution with a
commitment to heightened protection for religious believers
under the Free Exercise Clause. It was often conservatives (or at
least legal conservatives) who were most skeptical of this regime
on religious freedom, as shown, for example, by the views of
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Walter Berns, Justice Harlan (who dissented in Sherbert v.
Verner), then-Justice Rehnquist, and Philip Kurland. This was
also a period, however, in which the debate over religious
freedom was, broadly speaking, less contested than it is now.
The most vocal critics of the Warren and Burger Courts focused
their energy for the most part on abortion, criminal procedure,
and race. That period of mild contestation over religious freedom
culminated in Employment Division v. Smith, where Justice
Scalia drew an end to the era of liberal constitutional religious
freedom in a case involving a claimed religious exemption for
drug use (more precisely a religious exemption from the denial of
unemployment benefits for employees dismissed for drug use),
seen at the time as a victory for legal conservatism.
So what changed and why did things change? Smith’s
answer to this normative question proceeds mostly historically,
and I am wondering how the argument might be pressed more
philosophically or theologically.
In The Triumph of the
Therapeutic, Phillip Rieff called attention to a link between
sexual morality and Christian identity:
Historically, the rejection of sexual individualism (which
divorces pleasure and procreation) was the consensual matrix of
Christian culture. It was never the last line drawn. On the
contrary, beyond that first restriction there were drawn others,
establishing the Christian corporate identity within which the
individual was to organize the range of his experience.
Individuality was hedged round by the discipline of sexuality,
challenging those rapidly fluctuating imperatives established in
Rome’s remissive culture, from which a new order of
deprivations was intended to release the faithful Christian
believer.1

This account—that pagan Rome celebrated sexual gratification
and gave license to all manner of sexual expression (and
oppression)—is echoed in Smith’s book as well. I think there is
also a set of arguments Christians might make as to why this is
so, and why Christian morality includes a great deal of teaching
on sexuality (arguments that Smith sometimes gestures toward
but does not, understandably, fully develop in what is already a
long book).

1
PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER
FREUD 17 (1966) (citations omitted).
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Christian sexual morality includes claims about divine
authority and sanction, a view that runs contrary to a view
placing autonomy and self-expression at the center. Sexual
morality is tied up with theological claims about the authority of
the Bible, creation, and the significance of reproduction. Sexual
sin in Christianity is viewed as disordered desire and an
inordinate love of self generated by pride. In the Confessions
(and I am focusing most especially here on Book II), Augustine
tries to give an account of his own disintegration, his own
(perverted) love for incoherence as he reflects on his sexual
concupiscence. In the Augustinian view, sexual desire itself is
mediated by culture—what kinds of sexual desire are permissible
to entertain, and what forms of sexuality are encouraged or
prohibited.
Traditional Christian views on sexuality pose challenges to
the modern pagan (to use Smith’s parlance) on at least two
fronts. First, traditional Christian accounts hold to a view
affirming a natural differentiation of the sexes and the biological
significance of gender, with profound implications for gender
equality and sex. As argued at length by Alexander Pruss in his
book on Christian sexual ethics, the theological commitments
(particularly the doctrine of creation) of Christianity entail the
significance of nature and natural desire: “A natural biological
striving in a human being is always valuable in itself (though it
may be contextually inappropriate), since it is the normal
functioning of a creature made in the image and likeness of
God.”2 But is it only in a theologically informed view that affirms
the significance of creation in the first place that these views can
get a hearing?
Second, churches are among the most well-organized and
persistent opponents of permissive views on a range of matters
related to sex and reproduction, with abortion, contraception,
access to artificial reproduction, and same-sex marriage being
the most obvious examples. In such a climate, the secular debate
over sexual morality inevitably has come to shape our
understanding of religion itself. In the self-understanding of
most orthodox Christian churches, the central doctrines are
revelation and redemption and the primary activity is worship.
In the secular (or Smithian “pagan”) perspective, though, moral

2
ALEXANDER PRUSS, ONE BODY: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN SEXUAL ETHICS 141
(2012) (emphasis in original).
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teaching—with all of its taboos and purportedly bigoted
restrictions—is at the center of religion, with worship merely an
activity engaged in by those who choose to do so.
The
contemporary debate over religious freedom, then, distorts
Christianity itself because this debate over these moral questions
is already such a prominent feature of public life, and the church
becomes another site of such debate. The debate frequently
becomes a distraction of a kind and churches come to be
understood—both by those inside and outside of them—as little
more than advocacy organizations in the culture wars.
Because both sides in the discussion are sometimes at pains
not to address the substantive questions of sexual morality (in
part because it has become increasingly difficult even to imagine,
let alone garner public acceptance for, arguments that are
restrictive of sexual liberty), the discussion of religious freedom
(and legal doctrinal twists about compelling state interests,
narrow tailoring, third-party harms, and the like) comes to be a
substitute for those questions. Participants in these debates
really disagree about questions of sexual morality, but they flee
to a safer (in a sense) and legalistic debate over the First
Amendment and RFRA (with echoes here of Smith’s more
general point about law that he made in Law’s Quandary). One
of the many virtues of Smith’s provocative book is that it asks us
to wonder what those legal debates are really about, including
the odd but enduring centrality of sexuality to them.

